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BOOK REVIEW
PERCEPTIONS AND INTERPRETATIONS OF LAW FROM
PAST TO PRESENT IN THE SUBCONTINENT
JAYANTH

K.

KRISHNAN*

Changing Concepts of Rights and Justice in South Asia. Michael R.
Anderson and Sumit Guha, eds. Oxford University Press,
1988. pp. 290, $34.95 (hardcover)
I.

INTRODUCTION

What do the terms "rights" and 'justice" mean in South Asia?
How have these concepts changed over time? What role did the
British play in shaping how the people of this region perceived
issues of rights and justice? How do individuals and groups today
in South Asia interpret their rights and liberties and do they
believe they are living under a just system of laws? These are some
of the various queries that a relatively recent book entitled Changing Concepts of Rights and Justice in South Asia seeks to investigate.
Changing Concepts brings together scholars from diverse backgrounds, each offering a distinct perspective on the interplay
between law, justice, and human rights. Ultimately the book leaves
certain questions unanswered, but it is nonetheless a good read
and a definite contribution to the academic literature.
Because this volume includes almost a dozen different entries, I
shall provide in the next section a detailed review that comprises
nearly half of this essay. More frequently than not, such works of
this type tend to receive only cursory reviews before being subjected to a series of critiques. I fortunately am able to avoid this
pitfall because of the space allocation this journal has graciously
granted to me. With this said, though, upon completion of my
review I then proceed to comment on and rigorously evaluate several of the commentators' arguments in section three.
*
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OVERVIEW OF CHANGING CONCEPTS OF RIGHTS AND JUSTICE

IN SOUTH ASIA

In the introductory chapter, Michael Anderson and Sumit Guha,
the editors of the book, lay out the goals they have for this study.
For far too long, observers of South Asian legal history-whether
they are legal academics, historians, or anthropologistshave
been confined to their academic sub-specialties when trying to document how concepts of law, justice, and rights have evolved in this
region.' An important objective of the editors is to incorporate an
interdisciplinary approach to the study of legal history in South
Asia, which also recognizes the nuances and complexities that
inherently accompany such a project. 2 From the outset they are
critical of past oversimplifications and sweeping generalizations. In
particular, "studies of legal concepts [in South Asia] from the
1950's to the early 1980's continued to rely to a large extent on the
grand binary distinctions - status/contract, tradition/modernity,
East/West, law/custom, and alien/indigenous - which underpinned nineteenth-century colonial scholarship." 3 As Anderson
and Guha state, "such simplistic contrasts were largely discredited
'4
for their theoretical and empirical inadequacies. "
The editors make it clear that they are interested in including a
more profound comprehension of human rights from both a top5
down and, perhaps more importantly, a bottom-up perspective.
They insist that any legal historiography of human rights in South
Asia must include the multi-dimensionality of societal culture as
well as approaches that take into account Marxian, feminist, and
subaltern perspectives. 6 To their credit, Anderson and Guha
believe that while we must be sensitive to those distinct traits of
culture that penetrate and influence communities, we also need to
have a comparative understanding of what rights, justice, and the
rule of law mean to people in different societies. 7 Readers will pick
up from this introductory chapter that the editors are not striving
to develop a universal, "high" theoretical framework. Instead,
Anderson and Guha are merely seeking to inject a more diverse
1. MICHAEL R. ANDERSON & SUMIT GuHA, Introduction, CHANGING CONCEPTS OF
RIGHTS AND JUSTICE IN SOUTH ASIA 2 (Michael R. Anderson & Sumit Guha, eds., 2000).
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

3-4.
3.
5, 10.
2.
6.
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array of perspectives onto a subject that historically has been
viewed through narrow lenses.
In chapter two, Sumit Guha details how concepts of rights and
justice manifested themselves among different social classes primarily in eighteenth century western India. Specifically, Guha documents the development of rights in the state of Maharashtra. 8
Guha's main argument is that in this region, individuals had different types of rights and entitlements depending upon who they
were, their status within the society, and the political and social
norms that existed at that time. 9 While he concedes that these
ideas are not novel, one of his more important observations is that
contrary to conventional wisdom, customary law, which so frequently served as the basis for maintaining a community's hierarchical structure, was always "subject to contest and redefinition."'1 0
Guha suggests that while Maharashtra's population was diverse
during the eighteenth century-economically, politically, religiously and socially-the interaction among the people within this
society had a definite structure and order.1 Relationships among
the various social groups were shaped by a complex web of power,
rights, and authority that different players possessed vis-a-vis one
another. To illustrate this point Guha provides several brief case
studies describing the relationships and conflicts that existed over:
rights to land and office, 12 rights in the household, 13 rights of creditors and debtors,' 4 and rights of the state to use its power.' 5 Ultimately Guha concludes that in each of these cases, when people
asserted their rights and clamored for justice, the sources they
drew on to argue their claims did not come primarily from traditional religious principles, historical scriptures, or antiquated
notions of custom and culture.' 6 Rather, the manner in which
individuals expressed their demands was influenced by their social

8.

Sumit Guha, Wrongs and Rights in the Maratha Country: Antiquity, Custom, and Power

in Eighteenth-CentuyIndia, in CHANGING CONCEPTS OF RIGHTS AND JUSTICE IN SOUTH ASIA 14

(Michael R. Anderson & Sumit Guha, eds., 2000).
9. Id. at 25-26.
10. Id. at 26.
11. Id. at 16-18.
12. Id. at 16-19.
13. Id. at 20-33.
14. Id. at 23-24.
15. Id. at 24-25.
16. Id. at 15-18, 26.
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position within the community and the relevant political structure
7
that was present.'
In chapter three, Radhika Singha analyzes the type of criminal
justice that existed in the holy city of Banaras between 1781-1795.18
She focuses specifically on the Banaras Zamindari, an area administered by a regional landowner who was responsible for collecting
and paying taxes to the British. The starting date of her study is
1781, because it was in this year that there was a major anti-British
uprising in this city. The year 1795 is used as the ending point, for
by this time the British had formally established their judicial
power over the indigenous population. 19
Singha carefully documents how during this period several
important transformations occurred within the Banaras legal system. For one thing, the British East India Company (Company),
which at this time was in charge of the daily administration of
India, began to supplant the powers of local rulers with courts
(adalats) and police authorities who would report directly to Company officials. 20 These British institutions incorporated certain
"western" principles into their criminal court proceedings that elicited the disdain of the indigenous elites. For instance, requiring all
witnesses to take an oath before giving testimony and testifying as
to the truth of a criminal matter without proper regard to their
status, relationship to the parties, or of their willingness to testify,
gave rise to complaints that this eroded the elites' stature vis-a-vis
their social inferiors, since there was no special deference or spe21
cial treatment accorded to different classes.
The most interesting part of Singha's analysis involves the dialectical nature between Islamic and Hindu law on the one hand and
17. Id. at 24 (noting perhaps, not surprisingly, that the "wealthy and powerful had
(and have) more right than the lowly and the poor").
18. Radhika Singha, Civil Authority and Due Process: Colonial Criminal Justice in the
Banaras Zamindari, 1781-1795, in CHANGING CONCEPTS OF RIGHTS AND JUSTICE IN SOUTH
ASIA 30 (Michael R. Anderson & Sumit Guha, eds., 2000).

19. Id. at 31.
20. Id. at 33. Readers should keep in mind that for a long period of time the British
East india Company (Company) was in charge of running India. The Company, while
ultimately answering to the British government, nevertheless governed India quite independently until about the mid-1800's. For centuries, India was a confederation of small
princely states each ruled by an elitist set of officials. One of the classic tactics the Company used to establish its authority was to form alliances with these local rulers and then
"two-time" these partners by striking deals with other local authorities, all in an effort to
divide and conquer these petty regimes. For a detailed discussion of how the Company
operated, see generally SUNIL K-ILNANI, THE IDEA OF INDIA (1998); STANLEY WOLPERT, THE
NEW HISTORY OF INDIA (2000).

21.

Singha, supra note 18, at 38.
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the way the Company administered its legal system on the other.
From Singha's study we learn that the British viewed the indigenous criminal justice procedure-which often was influenced by
either customary practices or religious law-as incompatible with
notions of fairness and justice. 22 For example, Singha describes
the case of a set of grandparents who asked that the murderers of
their grandchild have "the nose and arm of each offender be cut
off."23 Similarly, she also discusses how the British objected to the
and dealIslamic practices of gathering evidence in a criminal case
24
adultery.
in
involved
individuals
of
instances
with
ing
Yet British efforts to substitute these indigenous traditions with
their own set of values and ideas resulted in an interesting development. In order to shape the law in a manner in which the local
population could relate, the British attempted to incorporate their
western legal principles together with existing Islamic and Hindu
laws. What emerged was an amalgamated form of Anglo-Muhammedan law and Anglo-Hindu law. 25 We learn from Singha's
account that in spite of their desire to bring about a more uniform,
"fair" system of criminal justice, the British ultimately had to make
important concessions to the customary practices of the Banaras
Zamindari, in order simply to maintain some semblance of legiti26
macy among the general community.
In chapter four, Sandria Freitag offers an illuminating case study
of the Sansiahs, "a peripatetic group who 'wandered' across north
India often extracting through guile and force a surplus from peasant society" during the nineteenth century.2 7 Freitag describes
how the British initially tolerated the Sansiahs despite the latter's
frequent dacoit-like behavior. 28 The reason was simple. In return
for providing the British with useful information that helped the
Raj further its political and legal goals, the Sansiahs were treated
differently than other criminal associations and received a certain
22. Id. at 4142 (noting that the British condemned the occasional Islamic practice of
avoiding retaliation of a murderer whose family asked for a pardon).
23. Id. at 43.
24. Id. at 49-61.
25. For a detailed discussion of this subject, see Marc Galanter and Jayanth Krishnan,
PersonalLaw and Human Rights in India and Israel,,38 ISR. L. REV. 98 (2000).
26. Singha, supra note 18, at 53-55 (noting that one particular concession that the
British eventually came to accept, and even rely on, coerced confessions that were made by
a defendant).
27. Sandria Freitag, Sansiahs and the State: The ChangingNature of 'Crime' and Justice' in
Nineteenth-Century British India, in CHANGING CONCERTS OF RIGHTS AND JUSTICE IN SOUTH

ASIA 82 (Michael R. Anderson & Sumit Guha, eds., 2000).
28. Id. at 88.
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set of implied rights and benefits. 29 However, as time passed the
relationship between the Sansiahs and the British changed. The
special status and rights allocated to the Sansiahs started to discontinue. As the British sought to strengthen their hold they increasingly began to view the Sansiahs more as criminal organizations
30
than anything else.

Yet as Freitag eloquently explains, the British pursued a criminal
justice policy that made it difficult to crack down on groups such as
the Sansiahs. As she notes, British officials in India:
posited an important distinction between individual crime, to be
treated under the 'rule of law' formulated through the Criminal
and Penal Codes developed between 1830 and 1860, and the
crime committed by collectivities [like the Sansiahs] for which
the nomenclature of the 'criminal tribes'-and
the infrastruc3
ture of the Criminal Tribes Act of 187 1-was developed. '
This two-track policy was mainly followed because it allowed the
British to quarantine criminal groups on agrarian settlements. 3 2
The British hoped, with this policy, that ultimately they could coopt relocated criminal groups to serve as allies against an emerging
Indian urban elite that threatened to undermine the colonial
33
authority.
However, this policy was not effective for obvious reasons. Trying to determine the conditions when individuals within the
group-as opposed to the group itself- should be sanctioned was
painstakingly complicated. 34 In addition, mobilizing these new
agrarian populations to adhere to British political plans was far
from easy. Attempting to change the identity of groups like the
Sansiahs, by seeking to alter perceptions of justice and rights
through political and legal means never fully garnered the necessary energy to be successful. 35 The most intriguing part of Freitag's
discussion, relates to her comments about how this historical case
study ties into the current controversies involving individual versus
collective rights in India. 36 She notes that the approach taken by
the British in interpreting rights and structuring their criminal pro29. Id. (noting that "to the extent that the [Sansiahs'] ties were predatory in nature,
however, they were justified by reference to the service Sansiahs rendered to their
patrons"). See id. at 89-92.
30. Id. at 92.
31. Id. at 96.
32. Id.
33. Id. 98-107.
34. Id. at 101-07.
35. Id. at 107-08.
36. Id. at 83, 108.
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cedure code during the 1800s may be directly connected to the
current challenges against claims that non-Hindus are making on
37
the state and on society.
G. Arunima's study of the Nayar community in Malabar sheds
light on the dichotomous power dynamics that inhered in the matrilineal system of kinship prevalent in this community during the
nineteenth-century. 3

8

As she notes:

On the one hand, matrilineal kinship implies that women are
central to this system because descent and inheritance are
traced through them. The personal and property rights that
women possess with this system are greater, and more varied,
than those held by patrilineal women. On the other hand, an
examination of the rights of the matrilineal Nayar women in the
nineteenth-century points
to the circumscription of precisely
39
these areas of power.

Her argument is that prior to the British involvement in the matrilineal household (taravad) in the 1800's, women's rights in the
Nayar community were an extremely complicated issue. Historically the norms and customs that characterized the taravad were
unstructured, contradictory, but still self-enforcing. 40 For example,
while gender differences were less of an issue in terms of property
law and in some family law matters, traditional Nayar women still
did not possess a full set of political rights equivalent to those of
men.41

The British introduction of an Anglo-Indian set of laws changed
the matrilineal legal system of the Nayars. Influenced by various
"Brahmanical principles" that tended to view societal relationsamong other ways-in terms of gender, these Anglo-Indian laws

42
brought a new type of duality to the role of women within society.

True, as Arunima contends the British introduced a different normative dimension to the discourse that emphasized "monogamous
marriages, conjugal co-residence and nuclear families with shared
property rights." 43 There was also an attempt to transform "social

37. Id. at 108.
38. G. Arunima, A Vindication of the Rights of Women: Families and Legal Change in Nineteenth-Centuiy Malabar,inCHANGING CONCEPTS OF PGHTS AND JUSTICE IN SOUTH ASIA 114-15
(Michael R. Anderson & Sumit Guha, eds., 2000).
39. Id. at 115.
40. Id. at 116-118.
41. Id. at 117-118.
42. Id. at 125.
43. Id. at 134.
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values and conventions" 44 by drawing on concepts of modernity
and western legal thought.
But at the same time Arunima demonstrates how the traditionally matrilineal system of the Nayar community was in fact
superceded by a more patriarchal structure. For instance, individual rights, historically defined in terms of patriarchy, were empha45
sized with the effect of limiting certain property rights of women.
Also, the legal discourse used by British-administered courts
tended to use language implying a male bias. 46 Subsequently,
women's rights in the household were altered as consequence of
this new amalgamated set of laws. 47 Arunima's overall point is that
as the matrilineal system had its share of complexities in terms of
the rights women possessed, the British influence similarly had a
paradoxical impact on how women were treated during the late
1800s.
Archana Parashar continues with this theme of gender justice in
her essay on Christian personal (family) laws in India. 48 In this
study, Parashar argues that the colonial practice of incorporating
English law onto Indian Christian family matters did little to lay the
foundation for women's rights in contemporary India.49 She rejects
the notion that the British, by bringing western principles into the
personal law matters of Indian religious communities, sought to
raise the status of women and preserve the sanctity of religious values. She details, for example, how the Indian Divorce Act of 1869,
which was a British measure affecting the rights of Christians,
failed to either ensure gender equality, or to provide for the meaningful expression of religious rules. 50 Similarly, the Indian Succession Act of 1865 also failed to effectively recognize women's rights
with respect to the inheritance of property. 5' The thrust of her
argument is that the impact of the colonial legacy on personal law
44. Id.
45. Id. at 131 (noting that in property disputes "in the 1870s and 1880s . . .women
could . . . [assert claims] only if they represented 'the family,' and thus a collective
interest.").
46. Id.
47. Id at 125-31.
48. Archana Parashar, Do Changing Conceptions of Gender justice Have a Place in Indian

Women's Lives? A Study of Some Aspects of Christian Personal Law, in CHANGING CONCEPTS OF
140 (Michael R. Anderson & Sumit Guha, eds., 2000).

RIGHTS AND JUSTICE IN SOUTH ASIA

49. Id. at 141.
50. Id. at 147. See also, Galanter & Krishnan, supra note 25 (describing in detail the
history and ramifications of the British influence of personal law on modern Indian
society).
51. Parashar, supra note 48, at 154.
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issues continues to adversely affect Christian women in contempo52
rary India.
Parashar recommends that the modern Indian state needs to
undertake a set of substantive policy changes if gender justice is
ever to be fully recognized. She believes that matrimonial property
law reform is one of the first steps that the government must initiate in order to achieve this goal. 53 According to Parashar, where
there is a divorce, it is absolutely crucial that property "be distributed equally between both partners." 5 4 In addition, Parashar
argues that the state ought to enact legislation permitting the dissolution of a marriage on the grounds of "irretrievable breakdown." 5 She acknowledges that there are several potential objections to this
latter proposal, and to her credit she pays sufficient time explaining each of these possible critiques. But she eventually concludes
by suggesting that what cannot be forgotten is that far too often
women are forced to stay in marriages because of a financial
dependence on the spouse. For Parashar, legislation adopting an
"irretrievable breakdown" standard as well as detailed, meaningful
property law reform are essential if women are really to have gen56
der justice in family law matters.
In chapter seven Radha Kumar examines the impact of British
Indian penal law on twentieth century Bombay. Specifically she
investigates those provisions dealing with kidnapping and adultery
and how they intersected with religious personal law to form the
basis of a highly complex social structure within this society. 57
Kumar focuses her attention on community mill-workers since this
working population consisted of immigrants from other parts of
South Asia. A hypothesis she considers is whether, given the
demographics of Bombay, the ancient social and religious norms
that contributed to the patriarchal social structure in other parts of
the country were as prevalent within this type of "plural" society.
52. Id. at 164. The literature on personal law in India, on not only Christians but
Hindus and Muslims, is voluminous. For a sample of insightful readings, see RELIGION AND
PERSONAL LAW IN SECULAR INDIA (Gerald Larson, ed., 2001), IN THE NAME OF JUSTICE:
WOMEN AND LAW IN SOCIETY (Swapna Mukhopadhyay, ed., 1998), J. DUNCAN M. DERRETT,
RELIGION, LAW AND THE STATE IN INDIA (1968); John H. Mansfield, The Personal Laws or a
Uniform Civil Code? in RELIGION AND LAW IN INDEPENDENT INDIA (Robert Baird, ed., 1993).
53. Parashar, supra note 48 at 171.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 165.
56. Id. at 169-72.
57. Radha Kumar, Sex and Punishment Among Mill-Workers in Early Twentieth Centuy
Bombay, in CHANGING CONCEPTS OF RIGHTS AND JUSTICE IN SOUTH ASIA 179 (Michael R.
Anderson & Sumit Guha, eds., 2000).
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By relying on an impressive array of archival records, Kumar
describes how in fact, women during this period were often caught
between an existing British Indian legal system that only on its face
provided them with increased rights, and a traditional, long-standing socio-legal culture that rejected concepts of gender equality
58
and gender justice.
Kumar offers highly researched accounts of cases where women
and girls were treated quite arbitrarily by the British courts; in certain instances she notes that the courts occasionally protected
female rights, while at the same time she also uncovers how these
institutions repeatedly failed to crack down on the tradition of
adult men marrying very young girls. 59 Kumar describes the intractability of the traditional customary structure by noting several
instances of women being exposed to horrific acts of mutilation by
their husbands who suspected them of adultery. 60 While the written British Indian penal law prohibited such behavior, Kumar
argues that between 1926 and 1942 the British "courts seemed
neither to have progressed from their idea of deterrence [of such
customary behavior] nor to have succeeded in deterring." 6 1
R.S. Khare, in his chapter on untouchable women, provides an
ethnographical account of the continuing struggles these individuals face in modern society. 62 Khare's study relies heavily on interviews he conducted of untouchable women as evidence of the high
levels of discrimination that still are present against this group at
home, in the work-place, in the political arena, and religious circles. 6 3 We learn from their own words that untouchable women
continue to be physically abused by their spouses, ignored by the
community at large, and left out of what they perceive to be primarily a middle-class women's movement. 64 As Khare discovers, there
is a great deal of sadness and resignation that has become almost a
fixed characteristic among untouchable women.
58. Id. at 178-181, 192-95.
59. Id. at 184 (noting that the "British themselves appear to have had difficulty in
regarding Indian girls of twelve or thirteen as children rather than sexually mature.").
60. Id. at 190.
61. Id. at 191.
62. R.S. Khare, Elusive Social]ustice, DistantHuman Rights: Untouchable Women's Struggles
and Dilemmas in Changing India, in CHANGING CONCEPTS OF RIGHTS AND JUSTICE IN SOUTH
ASIA 198 (Michael R. Anderson & Sumit Guha, eds., 2000). His study specifically focuses
on untouchable women in the state of Uttar Pradesh.
63. Id. at 214 (noting that "the denial of rights and justice to these women in found
deeply rooted in interlocking social, religious, political and economic spheres.").
64. Id. at 206-16.
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Paradoxically, though, while the situation for this group remains
bleak, untouchable women are not completely helpless. James
Scott's important work some years back on Malaysian peasants
argues that the poor and oppressed do have a limited arsenal with
which to defend themselves. 65 Similarly we learn from Khare's
study that untouchable women:
suffer yet rebel and devise rational strategies to secure a more
favorable (and just) social outcome for themselves and their
families. Their struggle for justice, like their social world,
revolves around their households (i.e., their children and the
aged, with or without their husbands). They endure.., physical
beating and66domestic abuse 'only for [their] family's sake and
its welfare.'
Khare finds that one way untouchable women "rebel" is by
instrumentally using religion-particularly the ancient Hindu concepts of karma and dharma-as a means of conceptualizing
notions of rights and justice. 67 There is a sense among these
women that their struggles will be recognized, whether by those in
this life or by a higher power in the next, and Khare shows that this
reconfiguration and interpretation of religion plays an important
68
role in this perception.
In the following chapter Jani de Silva explores what justice
means to schoolchildren who have experienced the terrible violence that has engulfed Sri Lanka over the past twenty years. 69 De
Silva specifically focuses on how the uprising of the Sinhalese-based
Janatha Vimukthi Perumana (JVP) between July 1987 and December 1989 affected these students' perceptions of law, governance,
justice and civil liberties.70 Since the 1980s, the Sri Lankan state
has been in a battle with militant Tamil separatists who primarily
have been situated in the north-eastern corner of the island. The
majority ethnic community of Sri Lanka is Sinhalese Buddhist, and
despite the state's attempts at putting down the Tamil rebellion,
many groups within the Sinhalese community, including the JVP,
65.

JAMES SCOTT, WEAPONS OF THE WEAK: EVERYDAY FoRMs

OF PEASANT RESISTANCE

(1985).
66. Khare, supra note 62 at 207.
67. Id. at 215.
68. For another study that examines how groups use religion as a motivating factor to
have their rights recognized, see generally Jayanth K. Krishnan and Kevin den Dulk, So
Help Me God.Explaining the Recent Rise in Religious Interest Group Litigation in the U.S. and
Beyond, 30 GA. INT'L & COMP. L. 233 (2002).
69. Jani de Silva, The Ethics of Struggle: Changing Political Perceptions Among Secondary
School Students in Southern Sri Lanka, in CHANGING CONCEPTS OF RIGHTS AND JUSTICE IN
SOUTH ASIA 220 (Michael R. Anderson & Sumit Guha, eds.,2000).
70. Id. at 221-223.
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have expressed extreme dissatisfaction with the various governments' responses. 71 In 1987, this growing hostility towards the government by the JVP came to a head with the result being a nearly
two year armed struggle between state forces and JVP militants.
De Silva documents the impact theJVP revolt had on a sample of
secondary students; his findings suggest that many of his interviewees were torn over the conflict. To a certain extent the students
indicated that they believed the state had a duty to preserve law
and order.72 Yet many were also sympathetic to the frustrations of
the JVP. As we learn from the respondents' comments there was a
sense that the JVP had legitimate concerns that simply were not
being "fulfilled by the state." 73 In addition, the students also
believed that several tactics employed by both the state and the JVP
frequently crossed the line and went well beyond what was right or
just.7 4 Perhaps most interesting to de Silva (and the reader) was
that the students, while at times hopeful and even slightly optimistic about the future, maintained a complacent and accepting attitude that regardless of who was in power, occasional abuses of civil
rights by the state were a fact of life in Sri Lanka. 75
The penultimate chapter by Pritam Singh examines the issue of
human rights in the post-colonial state of Punjab. 76 Despite having
a definite polemic tone to it, this chapter comprehensively
addresses issues of sectarianism in Punjab and how excessive
attachments to religion have affected individual rights and notions
of justice in this state. 7 7 Singh artfully describes how in the discourse of human rights, leaders within Punjab have used sectarianism in a calculated, instrumental manner in order to mobilize
supporters and demonize opponents.
For example, in the late 1960s and through the mid-1970s a
Maoist movement led by a group known as the Naxalites sought to
71.

For other selected works on this topic, see generally ROHAN GUNARATNA, SRI
A LOST REVOLUTION? THE INSIDE STORY OF THE JVP (1990); SRI LANKA: COLLECTIVE
IDENTITIES REVISTED (Michael Roberts, ed., 1997); PRINS GUNASEKARA, A LOST GENERATION:
SRI LANKA IN CRISIS: THE UNTOLD STORY (1998); Siri Gamage, Radicalization of the Tamil
Middle Class and Ethnic Violence in Sri Lanka, 24J. CONTEMP. ASIA 161 (1994).
72. De Silva, supra note 69, at 228-34.
73. Id. at 228-29.
74. Id. at 235-37.
75. Id.
76. Pritam Singh, Sectarianism and Human Rights Discourse: The Politics of Human Rights
in Post-ColonialPunjab, in CHANGING CONCEPTS OF RIGHTS AND JUSTICE IN SOUTH ASIA 239
(Michael R. Anderson & Surnit Guha, eds., 2000).
77. Id. at 244-49.
LANKA:
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undermine the government of the Sikh Akali Party-led coalition. 78
Singh describes that brute force as well as propaganda were important tools of the government's campaign against this rebellion.
"The emphasis of the publicity campaign was to present the Naxalites in a depoliticized form by projecting them as anti-social criminal elements who were bent upon disturbing societal peace and
social stability." 79 The goal was to present the enemy as less than
human and therefore not entitled to protection of basic human
rights.

80

This technique, as Singh describes, was not unique to the AkaliNaxalite conflict. Other movements such as the Hindu nationalist
movement and a Sikh military uprising, faced similar tactics by governments seeking to de-legitimize those who posed a threat to their
rule. 8 1 Conversely, these various movements also used the language and discourse of human rights in a stilted, biased way, with
the hope of garnering support from potential sympathizers.
Singh's eventual conclusion is that human rights need to be a universal concept that is not subject to the arbitrary whims of those in
power. Only by valuing the intrinsic worth of how individuals
ought to be treated will we ever come close to recognizing the true
82
meaning of the term human rights.

The final chapter by Nilanjan Dutta continues with the theme of
human rights by arguing that this issue needs to become an ideology that is supported and practiced on the grassroots level.8 3According to Dutta, in India "the post-colonial state.., has continued to subvert these rights with the same ferocity as its colonial
predecessor ... *"84 Dutta contends that only through a civil society that vigilantly protects individual rights and liberties, can we be
sure that democracy remains vibrant and free from government
oppression.
Dutta's analysis traces the consciousness of civil liberties among
the body politic, first during colonial times. 8 5 He shows that during this period the educated elite within Indian society thought of
78. Id. at 251-52.
79. Id. at 253.
80. Id. at 263.
81. Id. at 254-63.
82. Id. at 241, 263.
83. Nilanjan Dutta, From Subject to Citizen: Towards a History of the Indian Civil Rights
Movement, in CHANGING CONCEPTS OF RIGHTS AND JUSTICE IN SOUTH ASIA 275 (Michael R.
Anderson & Surnit Guha, eds., 2000).
84. Id. at 277.
85. Id. at 277-80.
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civil liberties primarily in terms of equal opportunity in the
86
workforce, freedom of the press and equality before the courts.
As time went on, Indians began clamoring for more rights, with the
eventual result being a call for independence. Dutta observes that
since 1947, however, leaders within India have failed to preserve
the principles of freedom that were the foundation of the struggle
for Independence. He cites various periods in post-Independent
India where the state on several occasions has undemocratically
cracked down on the civil rights and civil liberties of opposition
movements. 87 Dutta offers an overview of some of the more important organizations and social movements that have attempted to
stand up for individual freedom, but he concludes that such social
activism needs to be consolidated and more bottom-up pressure
from politically conscious citizens is needed - or else the democratic experiment in India is doomed to failure. 88
III.

EVALUATION AND CRITIQUE OF CHANGING

CONCEPTS

The edited volume that Michael Anderson and Sumit Guha offer
is one that should be read by those interested in notions of law,
rights, and justice in the subcontinent. The book provides an array
of perspectives and important historical insights, the latter being
an especially refreshing aspect considering the magnitude of the
issues involved. Furthermore, the inclusion of how culture, feminist thought, class, and politics affect the development of law is an
extremely valuable aspect to this volume. Clearly the contributors
are all well-read scholars and the ambition of this project is something that should be both recognized and praised.
With this said, however, there are a few general critiques I have
of this book, as well as several more specific comments on a number of the respective chapters. In terms of the general observations
it is true that the editors, from the outset, note that the purpose of
this book is not to set forth an all-encompassing legal theory that is
applicable in every environment. In an era when many scholars
are constantly proclaiming "eureka," such candor is certainly
appreciated. But at times I struggled even to find the slightest connection between some of these very diverse studies. Certainly,
notions of rights and justice are discussed in each of the chapters.
86. Id. at 277.
87. Id. at 280-87.
88. The groups include the Association for the Protection of Democratic Rights, the
Citizens for Democracy, The People's Union for Civil Liberties, and the People's Union for
Democratic Rights.
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Nevertheless, a clear, even middle-range, theoretical nexus that
could bring together these works was never lucidly and adequately
presented.
In addition, the title of the study intimates that the project seeks
to understand the changing aspects of rights and justice in South
Asia. As the editors and contributors know, South Asia consists of
India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Nepal at the very least,
with Bhutan, Maldives, and even Afghanistan being included as
part of the area for most observers as well. Most of the pieces,
though, in this book deal primarily with India. Prior to 1947, British India included what is today Pakistan and Bangladesh; therefore it is obviously more excusable to allow the particular
contributors whose studies are placed in that era to discuss matters
that center on "India." But since this volume is not restricted to
the pre-Independence period, it is a shame that more attention is
not given to the discourse of rights in other South Asian countries.
Additionally, we are never really given a sense of why these specific studies, as opposed to others on different topics involving
rights and justice in South Asia, are included within this volume.
We are told that this project grew out of a conference in New Delhi
during the mid 1990s, but the question of why a meeting of scholars necessitates a book of this nature is an assumption made without explanation. The fact that this question is not answered,
combined with the lack of a theoretical connection tying the chapters together, explains why certain important aspects regarding
rights and justice are not addressed by this book.
For example, one key issue that constantly plagues the legal system, particularly in India, is that its judiciary has one of the world's
worst systems of case-backlog.8 9 In the Indian Supreme Court,
observers have noted that over 20,000 petitions are awaiting adjudication. 9 0 One frequent explanation for why such a backlog exists
relates to the fact that Article 32 of the Indian Constitution allows
people to directly submit writ petitions to the Supreme Court in

89.

See

CHARLES

Epp,

THE

RIGHTS

REVOLUTION:

LAwYERs, ACTVISTS, AND

SUPREME

82-83 (1998); Bibek Debroy, Losing a World Record,
FAR EASTERN ECON. REV., Feb. 14, 2002 available at http://www.feer.com/articles/2002/
0202_14/pO23fcol.html. See also, Barry Bearak, In India, The Wheels ofJustice Hardly Move,
N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2000, at Al.
90. Debroy, supra note 89. See also, Epp, supra note 89, at 82-3 (noting that in "1990
the Supreme Court disposed of an impressive 56,343 cases; but at the end of that year
185,108 other cases still waited decision.").
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The Geo. Wash. Int'l L. Rev.

[Vol. 34

matters involving the public interest.9 ' But in actuality the real
problem is that the Indian lower courts are the centers of the greatest gridlock of cases. 9 2 Cases in the lower courts are known to linger on for decades, if not generations, with the ultimate result
being that basic rights are denied to millions of people.
Changing Concepts makes little mention of this enormous problem concerning rights and justice within India. Although data is
scant there is some indication that on a per capita basis, litigation in
India is quite low when compared to other countries in Asia,
Europe, and North America.9 3 The reason why people are being
denied justice and protection of their rights may have less to do
with the simplistic notion that Indians are somehow inherently very
litigious and more to do with a multiplicity of other factors, such as
the extraordinary amount of interlocutory appeals allowed by the
Indian civil procedure code and also resistance by the Indian bar
association. 9 4 Once again, though, it is a mystery how a topic of
such import to the general population is not addressed in a book
on rights and justice in South Asia.
In terms of more specific comments about the individual chapters, let me offer a few observations. First, regarding Sumit Guha's
piece, I am intrigued by his argument that social status contributed
to the power dynamic in eighteenth century Maharashtra, more so
than ancient customs and religious traditions passed down through
the years. Yet why Guha seems to suggest that the two conceptspower and tradition-need to be mutually exclusive is unclear to
91. INDIA CONST., art. 32 (1950) (noting "the right to move the Supreme Court by
appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of rights conferred by this Part is guaranteed. The Supreme Court shall have power to issue directions or orders or writs, including
writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warrantoand certiorari,whichever may be appropriate, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by this Part.").
92. See Debroy, supra note 89, (noting that "3.2 million [cases are sitting] in the High
Courts and 20 million in lower or subordinate courts. Half a million cases in the High
Courts have been on hold for 10 years or more, and almost I million in the lower courts.").
93. See, e.g., Christian Wollschlager, Exploring Global Landscapes of Litigation Rates, in
SOZIOLOGIE DES RECHTS: FESTSCHRIFT FUR ERHARD BLANKENBURG ZUM 60; GEBURTSTAG
(Jurgen Brand & Dieter Strempel, eds., 1998) (Since no national figures are available for
India, Wollschalager uses the state of Maharashtra for his comparison. Of course, several
caveats need to be made, including the fact that he looked only at a single state for one ten
year period, and that the Indian adult population of Marahrashtra's is comparively low.).
See also KATHARINE PISTOR ET. AL., THE ROLE OF LAW AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS IN ASIA EcoNOMIC DEVELOPMENT 1960-1995 246 (1999); Robert Moog, Indian Litigiousness and the Litigation Explosion, 33 ASIAN SURVEY 1136, 1138-39 (1993). See generally ROBERT MOOG, WHOSE
INTERESTS ARE SUPREME: ORGANIZATIONAL POLITICS IN THE CIVIL COURTS IN INDIA (1997)
(noting that filings dropped in the state of Uttar Pradesh from 1.63 per thousand persons
in 1951 to .88 filings per thousand persons in 1976).
94. See Debroy, supra note 89.
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me. Many years back Alvin Rabushka and Kenneth, Shepsle persuasively argued that the instrumental goals of ethnic groups are
defined by how they use concepts of culture, traditionally embedded social norms, and existing power structures. 9 5 Benedict Anderson's classic work on imagined communities demonstrates how the
ability of elites to control discourse and shape history allow the
reality (and eventually the destinies) of a people to be socially constructed by those in power. 96 Therefore, Guha's pitting of custom
and ancient norms against the forces wielded by those with social
and political control may be somewhat overstated.
Radhika Singha's account of British rule in Banaras during the
late 1700s is highly thoughtful and well-researched. Her thesis that
the British had to make concessions to the local customary traditions of the indigenous population in order to maintain power,
despite the Raj's attempt to incorporate western values of justice
into the legal system, illustrates the complexity of colonial rule. My
only question is whether this British acquiescence was all that
unique to India. One example that comes to mind is the manner
in which the British administered personal law in the Middle East
following World War I. In that situation, the British permitted the
millet system inherited from the Ottoman Empire to continue;
whereby each religious community was granted a great deal of latitude to administer its own set of laws governing such areas as marriage, divorce, adoption, and the like. 9 7 And as in India, one
important reason why the British conceded to this indigenous practice in the Middle East was because it was a way to maintain some
degree of legitimacy. Had Singha placed her study into a more
comparative context, this similarity would certainly have been
highlighted.
The issue of personal law is a subject also addressed in Archana
Prashar's chapter. Parashar notes that the British influence on
Christian personal law has had a resounding effect on the postcolonial rights of non-Hindu groups in India. Similarly, Sandria
Freitag contends in her study of the nineteenth century Sansiahs
95. See, e.g., ALVIN RABUSHiKA & KENNETH SHEPSLE, POLITICS IN PLURAL SOCIETIES
(1972) (Among many students of cultural pluralism, this book is cited frequently as a classic volume on instrumentalism and ethnic group behaviour.).
96. See generally BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS ON THE
ORIGINS AND SPREAD OF NATIONALISM (1983) (noting, in particular, that elites use the
media as a main tool for constructing reality). For another important classic that treats this
topic in a sensitive manner, see PETER BERGER & THOMAS LUCKMANN, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY (1966).
97. See generally Galanter and Krishnan, supra note 25.

The Geo. Wash. Int'l L. Rev.

[Vol. 34

that state action during that period has helped to influence the
identities of communities and individuals in modern day India.
Neither of the authors really offer much detail as to how such
historical influence has manifested itself today. To be sure, Freitag
cites the Mandal and Shah Bano cases, two key modem Indian
Supreme Court decisions; the former dealing with government
benefits for lower caste citizens while the latter relates to what type
98
of jurisdiction state courts would have over Muslim family law.
And Parashar does sketch out recommendations that a modern
state needs to consider when trying to implement gender justice.
But neither contributor presents a rigorous application of such
past lessons on today's political and legal environment in India.
Particularly surprising is the lack of any substantive discussion in
Parashar's chapter of the landmark Mary Roy ruling, a case where
the Supreme Court held that Christian women indeed were
allowed to inherit property despite restrictions set forth in the
Travancore Christian Succession Act .99 I wish both authors had
followed through on their goal of explaining the relevance of past
events on present day politics; both pieces no doubt would have
been clearly enhanced.
G Arunima, Radha Kumar, R.S. Khare each deal with issues relating to gender politics, but once again because a strong theoretical
nexus is missing, the pieces read more like discrete entities rather
than connected set of works. Arunima and Kumar illustrate the
dialectical impact of the British influence on Indian notions of
matrilineal structure and criminal law, respectively. Both pieces
are quite thoughtful and well researched, but the main question I
have is the extent to which diversity of thought existed among the
women in each of these studies.
My research in India reveals that Indian women's organizations-obviously not surprisingly-have diverse sets of views that
have been shaped by a variety of factors, from class to religion to
issues of identity. This point about heterogeneity among various
women's groups is especially seen in the debates over the hot-but98. Sawhney v. Union of India (The Mandel Case), (1992) SCC 217 (Supp.) 3; Mohd.
Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano, A.I.R. 1985 SC 945.
99. Mary Roy v. State of Kerala, 2 SCC 209 (1986). The statute in this case outlined
limitations on the types and amounts of inheritance Christian women could obtain. This
was an important case because the Supreme Court ruled that it ultimately had jurisdiction
over laws in the country - including religion-based personal laws. For a nice synopsis
discussing this case as well as others involving Christian personal law, see Sebastian
Champappily, ChristianLaw of Succession and Mary Roy's Case, (1994) 4 SCC Uour.) 9 (1994)
available at http://www.ebc-india.com/lawyer/articles/94v4a2.htm.
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ton topic of whether India should adopt a Uniform Civil Code
(UCC).100 The UCC was an initiative proposed by the nationalist
BhartiyaJanata Party during the early 1990s that would discontinue
the practice of religious groups being allowed to use their own
religious principles to govern matters relating to family law. Of
course detecting such differences among the women in Arunima
and Kumar's studies would be considerably difficult; R.S. Khare's
work on untouchable women even seems to suggest that little dissent existed at all among his interviewees. But including such a
caveat could be a useful supplement to what are otherwise three
interesting reads.
The three most pronounced pieces on human rights-de Silva's
chapter on Sri Lanka, Singh's work on Punjab, and Dutta's review
of pre- and post-colonial India- could be a separate monograph
on their own. First, in reading de Silva's chapter I felt torn. On
the one hand I laud his efforts to show how the humanity of children are affected by the struggles and atrocities associated with
war. At the same time, however, I was left asking several questions.
For example, to what degree do the courts in Sri Lanka contribute
to the disillusionment of not only children but of all citizens?
What role do judges and lawyers play in how issues of civil liberties
and civil rights are conceptualized - for that matter are they even
important players within this environment? And given that this is a
country that has seen years of military turmoil, what does justice
mean for the various other individuals and groups involved in this
conflict? I recognize de Silva is only trying to give us a snapshot of
a particular community that has been affected, but hopefully these
questions may be addressed in a later project.
In terms of the pieces by Singh and Dutta, both are intriguing
and offer keen perspectives on the discourse of human rights.
Singh's discussion of the Naxalite movement is particularly relevant to today's political climate in India, as a related Naxalite
group in southern India has been pinpointed by human rights
activists for engaging in a rather harsh form of justice.' 0 ' Specifi100. For recent works that discuss the women's movement and the relevance of this
issue, see generally MADHU KISHWAR, OFF THE BEATEN TRACK: RETHINKING GENDER JUSTICE
FOR INDIAN WOMEN (1999); MADHU KISHWAR, RELIGION AT THE SERVICE OF NATIONALISM
(1998); FLAvIA AGNUS, LAW AND GENDER INEQUALITfY: THE POLITICS OF W(OMEN'S RIGHTS IN
INDIA (1999) and GENDER AND POLITICS IN INDIA (Nivedita Menon, ed., 1999).
101. For reports that discuss the Naxalite conflict in Andhra as well as their summary
justice practices, see http://www.fas.org/irp/world/india/threat/naxalite.htm; http://
www.ploughshares.ca/CONTENT/ACR/ACRO0/ACROO-IndiaAndhraPradesh.html;
www.
fas.org/irp/world/para/pwg.htm.
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cally there are reports noting that within their guerilla held territories these particular Naxalites in the state of Andhra Pradesh are
conducting "trials" of those they deem as unsympathetic to their
10 2
cause-which has resulted in numerous summary executions.
Singh's description of the tactics used by the Punjab government
during the 1960s and 1970s have noticeable similarities to how
state forces today are responding to the current, on-going Naxalite
struggle. Regarding Dutta's argument, I agree that civil society
needs to be a leading force in the preservation of civil liberties and
civil rights is a theme that several western scholars have noted in
0 3
the law and courts literature.1
At the end of the day, Changing Concepts offers a diverse array of
works that many observers will find enjoyable to peruse. The various critiques mentioned above should not detract from the efforts
undertaken by these scholarly contributors. For too long this
region and its legal regimes have gone unnoticed by western judicial scholars. Despite the various troubles that have engulfed this
part of the world there still is a wonderful imagination and rich
legal history to this area that Changing Concepts takes an important
step towards highlighting. Particularly useful is the book's attention to the different dimensions of rights and justice during India's
pre-colonial period. And also insightful are those chapters that
address how the law has changed during India's (sometimes difficult) experiment with democracy. We can only hope that this volume will spur future research on the topics of rights and justice in
South Asia.

102.
103.
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